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Naval Services Game

6 November, 2012
The power of war gaming has been a critical part of US military studies and planning throughout
the years. It has evolved into significant efforts such as the Title 10 war games like the Navy’s
Global series and the Marine Corps’ Expeditionary Warrior series. These games dive into issues
of utmost concern to the individual services to provide data and enlighten a way forward for the
services along a myriad of topics. Yet, as a Naval Service, we have a responsibility to ensure we
jointly study issues of concern to both our Services.
This summer, at the behest of the newly formed Naval Board, the staffs of the War Gaming
Department at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island and Wargaming Division of the
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory in Quantico, Virginia integrated to conduct the first NavyMarine Corps war game since the SECNAV Wargame in 1994. In so doing the staff of the
Naval Services Game (NSG-12) succeeded in proving the utility of gaming to explore issues of
concern to the naval services.
By artfully limiting the scope of the game in order to fit an abbreviated timeline, the team
conducted a game that included Navy and Marine Corps leaders and subject matter experts from
across the warfighting spectrum to aid in defining the problems of naval force aggregation. As a
result of this game’s success future events can more deeply explore the details and potential
solutions in order to bridge the existing gaps in command and control, staff construct, doctrine
and training.
This report is hopefully the first of many efforts by our organizations to work together in the
interest of furthering the mutual goals of our services.

Rear Admiral John N. Christenson, USN
President
U.S. Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island

Brigadier General Mark R. Wise, USMC
Commanding General
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory
Quantico, Virginia
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October 22, 2012
From 11-13 September 2012, the War Gaming Department of the United States Naval War
College (NWC) in collaboration with the Wargaming Division of the Marine Corps Warfighting
Laboratory (MCWL), hosted the 2012 Naval Services Game (NSG). The Naval Board directed
both the War Gaming Department and the Wargaming Division to develop and execute a “proof
of concept” Navy/Marine Corps wargame that would permit the examination of issues of
concern to both services. The determination was made to explore the problems associated with
aggregating naval forces in response to an emerging conflict.
The ensuing analytic report was prepared by a core team of research faculty and professional
analysts from both of these institutions. The findings in this report reflect the observations,
insights, and recommendations that were garnered from participants during game play.
Moreover, this report reflects the use of a wide range of research methods and tools designed
to elicit intellectually honest analysis of complex problems.
For additional information please contact the Chairman, War Gaming Department, Naval
War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, RI 02841 or via electronic mail at
wargaming@usnwc.edu.

Prof. David A. DellaVolpe
Chairman
War Gaming Department
U.S. Naval War College

Dr. William Lademan
Director
Wargaming Divison
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Overview, Objective & Research Questions
The United States Naval War College (NWC) in Newport, Rhode Island, in partnership with the
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL), hosted the Naval Services Game (NSG) from
11-13 September 2012. The NSG was developed and executed under the sponsorship of the
Naval Board. The purpose of the NSG was to explore the challenges associated with aggregating
naval forces in response to an emerging conflict.
Specifically, the following objective was identified for this project:
Develop principles and identify potential gaps that result from the aggregation of naval forces
beyond the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG)/Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and Carrier
Strike Group (CSG).
Based on the Naval Board’s interest in force aggregation, and after performing a review of
related literature, the NWC’s War Gaming Department (WGD) and the MCWL Wargaming
Division (WGD) jointly developed the following overarching research questions:


As a naval force aggregates afloat, what are the implications on force structure?
What are gaps and areas of concern across DOTMLPF?



Relative to the following areas, (Mission, Task Organization, Battlespace
Organization, and Command Relationships) as a naval force aggregates, how will
command arrangements evolve?



What are other potential approaches for aggregating naval forces outside of typical
organizational structures?

Game Structure
The NSG was a one-sided, professionally facilitated, seminar event. It consisted of three,
unclassified, time-stepped vignettes, each of which expanded upon the aggregation of BLUE
forces in the maritime environment. The vignettes featured a notional scenario using real world
geography. A simulated conflict between the countries of GREEN and RED in 2014 served as
the initial condition. The participants were placed into one of two BLUE cells. BLUE Cell A was
comprised predominately of operators, whereas BLUE Cell B was staffed primarily with experts
in support establishment. Both cells were playing from the perspective of the Service Component
Commander during vignette 1, and from vantage point of the Joint Force Maritime Component
Commander during vignettes 2 and 3. The WHITE cell (also referred to as the Control cell), was
comprised of NWC WGD and MCWL WGD staff who served as the Combatant Commander
4
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during vignette 1 and the Combatant Commander/Joint Task Force Commander during vignettes
2 and 3.
During each of the three vignettes, each BLUE cell was required to collectively produce a
Course of Action (COA) sketch, complete individual Web-IQ surveys, engage in cell-based
facilitated seminar discussions captured by members of the control team, and provide content to
Web-IQ threaded discussions captured electronically, which emphasized the gaps, principles and
insights associated with naval force aggregation.
On the final day, players participated in a combined plenary session where they presented the
COAs developed during each vignette and discussed the gaps, principles and insights identified
during gameplay. Senior naval services leaders, such as RADM John Christenson (NWC), BGen
Mark Wise (MCWL), RDML Ann Phillips (ESG-2), and CAPT Michael Napolitano,
representing RADM Michael Tillotson (NECC), were also present during this session and their
insights were captured for inclusion in post-game analysis.

Summary of Participants
Thirty-five members of the United States Navy (USN) and Marine Corps (USMC), representing
officer pay grades O-4 through O-6 served as players in the NSG. Players averaged 21 years of
service per participant, including nearly 7 years of experience at the battalion/command level.
Players were highly educated, with 69 percent of participants holding a master’s degree or
higher. With respect to warfare specialties, 34 percent served in the surface/submarine warfare
community, 29 percent of participants were from Navy and Marine aviation, 14 percent were
USMC ground combat experts, 14 percent served in the intelligence/information dominance
community, and 9 percent belonged to the USMC logistics military occupational specialty
(0402). Both BLUE Cell A and Cell B were comparably matched in terms of players’ education
and expertise.

Summary of Analysis
Data were captured through a variety of techniques including cell-generated COAs, individual
player surveys, facilitated discussion, and threaded thematic sessions. The Data Collection and
Analysis Team (DCAT) subsequently employed several qualitative analytical techniques in order
to examine these data streams, ultimately yielding the following responses to the Naval Services
Game’s research questions:
Question #1: As a naval force aggregates afloat, what are the implications on force structure?
What are gaps and areas of concern across DOTMLPF?
Response: Overwhelmingly, players in both cells emphasized the importance of cultivating
command relationships. These relationships were defined as personal, structural, organizational,
formal and informal, and were deemed a precursor to effective force aggregation. Specifically,
5
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fostering organizational unity of command and developing a simplified command and control
(C2) element through the use of integrated staffs were also identified as essential preparatory
steps prior to engaging in a combined Navy-Marine Corps fight. Further analysis into doctrine,
organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF)
revealed that the elements of doctrine, organization, leadership, and training manifest the greatest
gaps in present-day Navy-Marine Corps joint operations.
Question #2: Relative to the following areas (Mission, Task Organization, Battlespace
Organization, and Command Relationships) as a naval force aggregates, how will command
arrangements evolve?
Response: Game participants identified lack of service culture awareness and diminished
understanding of cross-domain resources as the greatest challenges to combined Navy-Marine
Corps force aggregation. Specifically, Navy personnel did not fully comprehend amphibious
operations, whereas Marine Corps participants acknowledged only cursory familiarity with
maritime operations. This lack of fluency between the services presented the greatest challenge
for players when planning viable courses of action for combined operations in the littorals.
Moreover, because the composition and functionality of staffs are presently bifurcated towards
either maritime or land operations, mission planning, and task and battlespace organization
continue to challenge the commander engaged in combined Navy-Marine Corps operations.
Question #3: What are other potential approaches for aggregating naval forces outside of
typical organizational structures?
Due to the finite time constraints imposed upon game play (i.e., three vignettes over less than
two days of game play), participants in the 2012 Naval Services Game opted to focus on the
gaps, principles, and issues germane to force aggregation rather than delve into alternate
perspectives on atypical organizational structures. However, data garnered from both cells
suggests that regardless of organizational structure considered, greater emphasis needs to be
placed on cultivating command relationships, and simplifying and unifying command and
control structures.
During the course of game play, the participants were asked to identify any potential gaps and
propose principles based on the difficulties they faced in aggregating naval forces. Both BLUE A
and B cell participants were expected to focus on naval force aggregation issues and the
evolution of command relationships throughout game play.
On the final day of the NSG, BLUE cells A and B participated in a combined plenary session
that allowed them to present the COAs developed during each of the three vignettes, and to
discuss the gaps, principles, and insights garnered by the players. The following gaps and
principles were identified by either BLUE cell A or BLUE cell B, but not necessarily by both,
and not in prioritized order.
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Participant Identified Principles of Aggregation


Naval staffs organized and manned by permanent and appropriately skilled Navy and
Marine staff officers in each functional area provide full command and control of the
naval battle, and facilitate force integration.



Integrated operational planning facilitates coordination, seamless operations, and ensures
desired operational tempo.



Continuity of Command and effective C2 is maintained by staff organization that
accounts for changes in force structure as the mission evolves.



Interoperability of systems and TTPs, and common operational terminology enables
seamless aggregation.



Common Training and Education in Naval warfare facilitate aggregation.

Participant Identified Gaps Affecting Aggregation


Insufficient doctrine to guide battlespace organization, staff organization, integrated
logistics, and seamlessly synchronized operations across littoral, surface, subsurface and
air.



MOCs and other naval staffs are not integrated, organized and manned with appropriate
expertise and service composition to enable integrated maritime operations.



Limited common training (Navy/Marine Corps) of personnel, staffs, and leaders that
build experience with aggregation and cross service understanding of requirements and
capabilities.



Operational logistics lacks doctrine, organization, training and systems to integrate across
service and functional areas with the speed, flexibility and scope required aggregation.



Current equipment and systems lacks the interoperability required for flexible and
integrated operations.

Conclusions and Recommendations for Further Study
The 2012 Naval Services Game brought together warfighters from the USN and USMC in order
to explore issues germane to force aggregation in combined operations. Despite the differences
7
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in the composition of BLUE cells A and B, findings between the two cells were nearly identical.
Indeed, game findings collectively highlighted the cultural differences between both services and
the need to enhance command relationships—ultimately yielding more integrated and efficient
command and control structures. Analysis further suggests that aggregating forces for operations
conducted in the littorals presents the greatest challenges for Navy-Marine Corps missions.
Additional efforts to cultivate command relationships should be undertaken including, but not
limited to conducting additional games focused on inter-cultural awareness and the continued
refinement of principles and gaps through analysis; developing and exercising C2 integrated
staffing models; and formulating doctrine to address aggregation and provide guidance to gap
closure. Moreover, the development of a 2013 Naval Services Game to continue exploring Navy
and Marine Corps operations is recommended. Lastly, the Naval Warfare Group should be
consulted to distill other tangible actions for future decision/direction.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Statement of Sponsor’s Interest in this Topic
According to the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, “the speed, flexibility, agility
and scalability of maritime forces provide joint or combined force commanders a range of
options for responding to crises (2007, p. 8)”. However, such benefits can only be garnered if the
maritime services, especially the warfighting-focused Navy and Marine Corps have a holistic
appreciation beyond their own strengths to include the capabilities and equities of their sister
services.
Towards this end, in the spring of 2012, the Naval Board tasked the United States Naval War
College’s War Gaming Department (NWC WGD) and the Marine Corps Warfighting
Laboratory’s Wargaming Division (MCWL WGD) with cooperatively developing a game that
would explore the gaps, issues, and principles germane to the aggregation of Navy and Marine
forces at the operational level of war. The project was subsequently termed as the 2012 Naval
Services Game (NSG).
The purpose of this report is to discuss the NSG, including the game’s objectives and research
questions, design, and participants. In addition to these descriptive elements, this Report will also
summarize and analyze player findings and insights, especially as they pertain to the gaps and
principles associated with combined Navy-Marine Corps force aggregation at the operational
level. Lastly, concluding comments will be stated.

B. Game Purpose and Objective
The purpose of the NSG was to explore the challenges associated with aggregating naval forces
in response to an emerging conflict. Specifically, the following objective was identified for this
project:
Develop principles and identify potential gaps that result from the aggregation of naval forces
beyond the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG)/Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and Carrier
Strike Group (CSG).

C. Overarching Research Questions
Based on the Naval Board’s interest in force aggregation, and after performing a review of
related literature, the NWC WGD and MCWL WGD jointly developed the following three
research questions:
Research Question #1: As a naval force aggregates afloat, what are the implications on force
structure? What are gaps and areas of concern across DOTMLPF?
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Research Question #2: Relative to the following areas (Mission, Task Organization, Battlespace
Organization, and Command Relationships) as a naval force aggregates, how will command
arrangements evolve?
Research Question #3: What are other potential approaches for aggregating naval forces
outside of typical organizational structures?

D. Identification of Independent, Dependent, and Moderator Variables
In order to objectively conduct research into the relationship between force structure and
aggregation and its gaps and implications, the Data Collection and Analysis Team (DCAT)
identified both the independent variables (i.e., those items that can be manipulated by the
researchers for the purpose of conducting the study) and dependent variables (resultants).
Moreover, the relationship of these two variables to a third variable, referred to in social sciences
research as a moderator variable, was also included.
Identifying the independent and dependent variables was important, because it established the
parameters that would be studied in the 2012 Naval Services Game. By bounding game design
around the independent variable (naval force aggregation) as it pertains to the dependent
variables (implications, gaps, and the evolution of other command relationships), analysts were
able to focus their research efforts on the objective promulgated by the Naval Board. Moreover,
the inclusion of moderator variables allowed data to be collected along specific lines of inquiry,
thus affording the cell facilitators the opportunity to keep cell discussions concretely focused
during game play.
Based on the three research questions posed in this project, the independent, dependent and
moderator variables were identified as follows:
Research Question #1
 Naval force aggregates afloat (Independent)
 Implications on force structure? (Dependent)
 What are gaps and areas of concern across DOTMLPF? (Dependent)
Research Question #2
 Naval force aggregates (Independent)
 Mission (Moderator)
 Task organization (Moderator)
 Battlespace organization (Moderator)
 Command relationships (Moderator)
 How do command arrangements evolve? (Dependent)
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Research Question #3
 Naval force aggregates (Independent)
 Outside of typical organizational structures (Moderator)
 What are other potential approaches? (Dependent)
The NSG sought to answer these questions through direct observation of participants (i.e.,
ethnographic data capture), individual player surveys, facilitator-guided sessions within each of
the player cells, and via a final, all-inclusive plenary session.

E. Definition of Key Terms
In order to ensure that all participants in the game were grounded in a common lexicon, the
following terms and concepts were provided to them for reference throughout data collection
periods of the NSG (e.g., individual player surveys, cell-based plenaries). Many of these terms
were also presented in the academic sessions held prior to game play, which emphasized the
Maritime Operations Center (MOC), Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC)
Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF), and Composite Warfare Commander (CWC)
constructs of combined Navy-Marine Corps operations.
Naval Aggregation: The process of aligning naval forces using common tactics, techniques, and
procedures in arrangements that allows them to operate in an integrated manner. The inherent
mobility, organizational agility, and self-sustainability enable forward postured naval forces to
tailor themselves across the range of military operations from geographically disparate locations
with a variety of options.
Effective aggregation of maritime forces relies on common tactics, techniques, and procedures
associated with intelligence, command and control (C2), fires, maneuver, logistics, and force
protection. This underscores the importance of sufficient joint and combined training, and of
interoperable systems, to achieving and sustaining operational readiness. The Naval Service
constantly seeks to sustain this critical foundation, to include allies and partners. The intertwined
dynamic of the air/sea-superiority fight and the amphibious assault makes it critical that these
operations are tactically integrated.
The following key terms and definitions were internally developed during the design phase of the
2012 Naval Services Game, and used by players as common language in their plenary
discussions and survey responses.
Gap: Gaps are shortfalls, imposed limitations, and missing elements necessary for accomplishing
objectives.
Principle: A guideline grounded in a foundation of past experiences and present observations,
intended to shape future actions.

12

Naval Services Game

The following additional key terms and definitions were used throughout game play:
Doctrine: The way we fight (e.g., emphasizes maneuver warfare, combined air-ground
campaigns). Fundamental principles by which military forces, or elements thereof, guide their
actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.
(CJCS-CSM 3170.01C, dated 1 May 2007)
Organization: How we organize to fight divisions, air wings, MAGTFs. Defines the structures
and groupings that are used by formations and units on operations. (CJCS-CSM 3170.01C, dated
1 May 2007)
Training: How we prepare to fight tactically; basic training to advanced individual training,
various types of unit training, joint exercises, etc. (CJCS-CSM 3170.01C, dated 1 May 2007)
Materiel: All the “stuff” necessary to equip our forces, that is ships, tanks, self-propelled
weapons, aircraft, etc., and related spares, repair parts, and support equipment, but excluding real
property, installations, and utilities necessary to equip, operate, maintain, and support military
activities without distinction as to its application for administrative or combat purposes. (JP 102)
Leadership: How we prepare our leaders to fight from the squad leader to four-starGeneral/Admiral. Further defines specific training and leadership requirements; this refers to the
development of leaders primarily through further education. (CJCS-CSM 3170.01C, dated 1 May
2007)
Personnel: The availability of qualified people for peacetime, wartime, and various contingency
operations. Those individuals required in either a military or civilian capacity to accomplish the
assigned mission. (CJCS-CSM 3170.01C, dated 1 May 2007)
Facility: A real property such as installations and industrial facilities that support our forces.
(CJCS-CSM 3170.01C, dated 1 May 2007)
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II. GAME DESIGN
A. Discussion of Game Design
The 2012 Naval Services Game (NSG) was held over three days, from 11-13 September 2012 at
the United States Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. Figure 2.1 and table 2.1 depict
the overall flow of the game, while Appendix “D” provides the detailed schedule of events.

Figure 2.1 – 2012 Naval Services Game Design Flow
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Table 2.1 – 2012 Naval Services Game Summary Schedule

The Naval Services Game (NSG) was a one-sided (i.e., opposing force elements embedded into
the scenario as opposed to free play), professionally facilitated seminar style event. It was
comprised of three, unclassified time-stepped vignettes, each of which expanded aggregation of
the BLUE force in the maritime environment.
The vignettes featured a fictitious scenario employing real world geography. Set in the year
2014, a notional conflict between the countries of GREEN and RED served as the initial
condition, with the country of GREEN identified as a key democratic partner of BLUE. An
overview of Vignettes 1-3 follows:


Vignette 1 (Initial Crisis, C-7 to C-Day) – BLUE Forces: ARG/MEU, CSG, LCS



Vignette 2 (Advance Force and Entry Operations, C-Day to C+15) – BLUE Forces: Vignette
1 BLUE Forces + JTF, JFMCC, JFACC, MEB/ESG CE, ARG/MEU, MCM, SOF



Vignette 3 (Sustained Maritime Operations, C+15 to C+40) – BLUE Forces: Vignette 2
BLUE Forces + MPS, FIE, CSG, JFLCC

Participants in BLUE Cell A and BLUE Cell B were expected to focus on naval force
aggregation issues and the evolution of command relationships throughout the game. Both cells
played from the perspective of the Service Component Commander during Vignette 1 and from
the viewpoint of the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) staff during
15
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Vignettes 2 and 3. The WHITE Cell (also referred to as the Control Cell) acted as the Combatant
Commander during Vignette 1 and the Combatant Commander/Joint Task Force Commander
during Vignettes 2 and 3. BLUE cell players were provided with the scenario, higher
headquarters Operational Order (OPORD), BLUE force flow, and both GREEN and RED force
composition and actions.

B. Game Mechanics and Participant Assignments
During the morning of the first day (11 September 2012), players convened in the McCarty Little
Hall (MLH) Decision Support Center where they received a series of briefings that created a
common understanding of initial conditions at the start of the first vignette. Briefing topics
included a game overview along with presentations on the MOC, JFMCC, MAGTF, and CWC
constructs. The final presentation consisted of the road to war brief and an overview of vignette 1
(refer to Appendix A of this game report).
Following these presentations, the 35 participants were divided into two player cells, referred to
as BLUE Cell A and BLUE Cell B, respectively. Participants assigned to BLUE cell A were
primarily USN/USMC officers currently serving in operational billets. In contrast, BLUE cell B
participants were primarily from supporting establishment billets.
The two cells were given an identical scenario, and were asked to complete a situation review,
Course of Action (COA) development activity, and individual WEB-IQ surveys. Cell members
also participated in a facilitated seminar discussion and a WEB-IQ threaded discussion activity
for each vignette.
A detailed demographic summary of NSG players including their names, ranks, and
organizations/commands is found in Appendix E of this Report. In brief, players in the NSG
represented officer pay grades O-4 through O-6. They averaged 21 years of service per
participant, including nearly 7 years of experience at the battalion/command level. Players were
highly educated, with 69 percent of participants holding a master’s degree or higher.
With respect to warfare specialties, figure 2.2 summarizes that 34 percent served in the
surface/submarine warfare community, 29 percent of participants were borne from the Navy and
Marine aviation, 14 percent were USMC ground combat experts, 14 percent served in the
intelligence/information dominance community, and 9 percent belonged to the USMC logistics
military occupational specialty (0402).
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Warfare Specialty Level
Surface/Submarine
Warfare
Logistics

14% 14%
9%
29%

Intelligence/Information
Dominance
Ground Combat

34%

Aviation
Figure 2.2 – Warfare Specialty Areas of 2012 Naval Services Game Participants

Both BLUE Cell A and Cell B were comparably matched in terms of players’ education (refer to
Appendix E of this Report), with 69 percent of the players holding a master’s degree or higher.
As shown in figure 2.3, participants in the 2012 Naval Services Game possessed a wealth of
battalion/command experience (mean=6.5 years). BLUE cells A and B, each contained a nearly
equal number of Navy and Marine Corps representatives. The command/battalion experience
difference between the two player cells was statistically insignificant.

Mean Years of BN/Command
Experience per Cell
10

Years

8
6

4
2
0
BLUE A

BLUE B

Group
Figure 2.3 – Mean Years of Battalion/Command Experience per Player Cell
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The WHITE cell, also referred to in this Report as the Control Cell, consisted of NWC WGD and
MCWL WGD staff. These personnel were responsible for responding to any requests for
information (RFIs) that the player cells submitted. The WHITE cell also served as the Combatant
Commander during vignette 1 and the Combatant Commander/Joint Task Force Commander
during vignettes 2 and 3. Lastly, WHITE cell members were charged with analyzing the COAs
submitted by the cells and determining any follow-on opposing force actions that would take
place in order to stimulate discussion about gaps, principles, and insights that the players
identified during the each vignette.
Upon completion of identifying discussion points to emphasize with the players based on their
actions and the game’s overarching research questions, facilitated seminars were conducted at
the end of each vignette (11 and 12 September 2012). These discussions provided the
opportunity for players to present their perspectives and insights on the gaps, principles, and
insights associated with naval force aggregation. Ethnographers are assigned to each BLUE cell
in order to capture these discussion highlights. The WEB-IQ software application was used to
launch both the individual player surveys and to capture player comments in a threaded
discussion format.
On the final morning of the NSG (13 September 2012), both BLUE cells were allowed time to
revise the gaps, principles, and insights identified during each of the three vignettes. This refined
information was incorporated into BLUE Cell A and BLUE Cell B outbriefs (refer to Appendix
B). These briefings were subsequently presented during the combined plenary activity, which
took place on the afternoon of 13 September 2012. This combined plenary activity served as the
first opportunity for both BLUE cells formally to exchange ideas in a facilitated forum.
The full schedule of events for the Naval Services Game is found in Appendix D of this game
report.

III. ANALYSIS & RESULTS
A. Summary of Player-Identified Data
During the course of game play, the participants were asked to identify any potential gaps and
propose principles based on the difficulties they faced in aggregating naval forces. Both BLUE A
and B cell participants were expected to focus on naval force aggregation issues and the
evolution of command relationships throughout game play. Despite the differences in the
composition of BLUE cells A and B, findings between the two cells were nearly identical.
On the final day, players participated in a combined plenary session where they presented the
COAs developed during each vignette and discussed the gaps, principles and insights identified
during gameplay. Senior naval services leaders, such as RADM John Christenson (NWC), BGen
Mark Wise (MCWL), RDML Ann Phillips (ESG-2), and CAPT Michael Napolitano,
18
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representing RADM Michael Tillotson (NECC), were also present during this session and their
insights were captured for inclusion in post-game analysis.
The following gaps and principles were identified by either BLUE cell A or BLUE cell B, and in
some cases by both, but not in prioritized order. They include the descriptive summaries of the
player-identified gaps and principles, as well as their associated recommendations for
improvement.

a. Descriptive Summary of Player Identified Gaps and Proposed Solutions
Identified Gap

Insufficient doctrine

MOCs and other naval
staffs are not integrated,
organized and manned

Limited common
training

Description
Service doctrine does not effectively
address the aggregation of naval forces.
Doctrine is needed to describe how to
aggregate forces consistent with the
principles of C2 simplicity, flexibility,
unity of command, unity of effort, and
seniority.
Current Staff compositions and
functionality are oriented toward either
maritime or land. This doesn’t provide a
commander with SMEs needed to inform
decisions. The lack of staff integration
causes gaps between USN/USMC forces.

There is a knowledge (i.e. training) gap
in both USN and USMC in regards to
other service’s doctrine, staff
organization, operation, resources and
capabilities of assets. Multi-MEU
operations are not practiced. Exercises
and training always start at the final level
of effort (MEU or MEB) rather than
starting small and growing as forces
arrive. CSG and MEU/MED training is
not currently conducted. Cross service
capabilities and operations are not
understood and therefore complicate the
coordination, command relationships,
and mission execution.
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Proposed Solution
Develop Navy and Marine
warfighting publications in
USMC/USN formal schools at all
levels that educate officers on
naval force aggregation. Review
and update existing doctrine to
reflect current service capabilities.
Reorganize Naval Staffs, assigning
Navy and Marine Corps personnel
to the appropriate functional areas.
Permanently integrate Navy
personnel into Marine staffs and
Marine personnel into MOCs.
These combined staffs will be able
to provide better tailored support to
the warfighter.
Conduct Naval Services
PME/Wargames. Service schools
and distance education programs
must teach staff processes,
organization, resources and
capabilities. Formalize a process
for integrating MEU. Combine
MEUs and place MEU
commanders into lead roles of the
land, ACE, etc. Conduct cross
service training and exercises.
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Operational logistics
lacks doctrine,
organization, training
and systems to integrate

Current equipment and
systems lacks the
interoperability

Battlespace
organization

Existing Naval
Headquarters are not
fully capable of
conducting fullspectrum littoral
operations.

Seabase Aggregation
and C2

The aggregation of the warfighting
function of logistics at the operational
level, when it is primarily seabased, is
challenging. Logistical support is
required not only within the Joint
Operation Area (JOA), but also around
it. The question of who is responsible for
and how to execute logistics becomes an
issue. Aggregating forces together can
result in relationships that have differing
and incompatible logistics chains. As
forces aggregrate, we need to provide
continuity of logistics both afloat and for
those transitioning from sea to shore.

The only allies possessing a mature and
secure comm link are our NATO allies.
The ability to pass secure comm and data
to non-NATO allies remains a challenge.
There lacks a common, holistic
understanding of how to organize the
battlespace to support the naval battle. In
order to eliminate the seam that exists
between land and sea domains during
littoral operations, a different way of
thinking, organizing, and employing
control measures needs to be developed
Currently Naval HQs are capable of
conducting integrated naval operations,
but lack the understanding of amphibious
and land operations necessary to conduct
integrated littoral operations.

As naval forces aggregate within the
JOA, the seabased footprint will continue
to grow. Command, Control, and
visibility of seabased assets become
more complex and may exceed the
capabilities of multiple CTF
commanders.
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Improve joint training and
coordination between entities for
the application of operational
logistics inside and outside of the
JOA. More formal structures are
required for training and practical
experience as we continue to
operate in more joint
environments. CJTF direct
additional theater logistics (TAOE/T-AKE) to support the
CJFMCC. This will provide
seabased logistics for both forces
afloat and ashore until a solid log
trail is established ashore for
ground forces.
Upgrade comms onboard existing
naval and allied shipping.

Establish TTPs that yield naval and
joint doctrine and allow a
continuous flow of operations from
sea to littoral to landward
objectives.

USMC structure and personnel
should be permanently assigned to
existing Fleet HQs to enable
littoral operations and single naval
battle principles within the
maritime operations areas. An
integrated USMC/USN Joint Force
Littoral Component Commander
(JFLWCC) should be established
where sea/air control and power
projection are inextricably linked.
Assign a single commander
responsibility for all seabased
assets. Operational level C2 of all
seabased sustainment assets will
enable flexible and responsive
support to the JFMCC and JTF
commanders.
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JFMCC
Communications

JFMCC ISR

JFMCC must look up and out, not just
down and in. JFMCC comms can be
restricted if afloat on platforms where
existing commander and staffs are
already embarked. Need a standardized
comms suite to support JFMCC and
existing commander and staffs.
Limitations of current organic ISR
capabilities hinder the achievement of
persistent ISR and the ability to cover the
dimensions of the single naval
battlespace.

Determine combined comms
requirements for all organizations
embarked when JFMCC is afloat.
Develop materiel solution that
meets requirements and includes
future expandability.
Increase organic naval ISR and
include USN/USMC personnel in
Naval staff integration and training
to ensure seamless processing,
exploitation, and dissemination.

b. Descriptive Summary of Player Identified Principles
Principles

Naval Staffs

Integrated Operational Planning

Description
Naval staffs are comprised of both USN and USMC personnel to
provide full command and control in a single staff. The JFMCC staff is
the primary incorporation of this principle and is organized along
functional operational lines of in a construct such as naval battle with
appropriately skilled USN/USMC personnel assigned to each functional
area. The JFMCC staff and lower echelon staffs such as CSG, ESG, and
MEB incorporate permanent staff officers to facilitate force integration
at that level. As forces aggregate, staffs need to be combined or utilized
in different manners (including removing someone from command).
Experience and seniority of CDR and Staff-command relationships are
easier to define. Knowledge and ability to find critical information
about unit capabilities are critical for providing the Commander with an
accurate picture.
Naval forces require common operating terms and graphics, common
tactics, techniques and procedures, and the appropriate material
solutions (systems) in order to support common understanding. They
need to be consistent with concepts like Joint Operational Access and
Air Sea Battle. The naval service must also have systems fully capable
of seamless information exchange. The continuous process of planning
and sequencing key events relative to one another in a timely and
coordinated manner to ensure continuity of operations and desired
operational tempo. In context, this addresses seamless operational
execution that seeks to avoid transitional gaps.
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Continuity of Command and
Effective C2

Interoperability

Common Training and
Education
Mission Precedence

Force Flow and Arrival Time

Consistency
Professionalism
Flexibility
Combat Efficiency
Duration

Developing command and control architecture with a flexible construct
facilitates seamless transition of authority as mission requirements
concurrently increase with level of command and organizational
responsibility and capacity. Transfer of authority at every level of
command should be planned in detail in order to offset staff and force
rotations and avoid simultaneous knowledge and experience gaps.
During the process of naval force aggregation, the principle of
simplicity must be observed. Existing command structures that continue
to provide effective C2 should be maintained so that new forces and
capabilities can be added with minimal disruption. Although naval
force aggregation is initially about command and control between USN
and USMC forces, it must also be able to operate in and easily
transition to the context of joint C2. C2 arrangements need to be
complimentary to established joint C2 such as functional and/or service
componency. When aggregating a force, unity of effort will often prove
more effective in accomplishing the mission than strict adherence to
unity of command. For subordinate units, the supporting/supported
relationships will more easily synchronize when there is no argument
about who is in charge. This will allow for greater flexibility as the
focus of effort changes throughout the various phases of the operation.
Technology, Culture, Language. Force must be able to work together
(comms, systems, etc.) More cross service and cross community
training and experience is required to be effective moving forward.
Forces which are able to link resources, share C2 nodes, and coordinate
actions real time have a distinct advantage.
Implementing supported/supporting relationship is easier with
training/practice.
The commander must identify the priority mission and adjust
supported/supporting relationships to appropriately synchronized
priorities.
Force Flow and Arrival Time Description: Force aggregation is driven
by the requirement to build a larger force than the initial first arriving
crisis response force(s). The operational commander determines how
and when these forces arrive into his AO based on mission
requirements. As possible, units/ships preparing to deploy as the FOE
for a naval crisis response force should be tailored and embarked IAW
mission requirements and time constraints in order to reduce or
eliminate the requirement for operational pause in the AO and create a
more seamless transition into the operation.
Task organization should account for incoming forces so that each time
a new unit enters the theater the organizational chart doesn’t need to
change.
Commanders need to be mission oriented and overcome difficulties in
personal interaction
Establish a CSF with a subordinate Strike Warfare Commander
Maximize the use of resources and the unity of effort.
Ability to sustain. Aggregation options and execution are dependent on
the duration of the operation.
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Span of Control
Understanding the capabilities of
assigned units
Battlespace Organization
Seaborne Sustainment
Flexibility

Proximity
Clear Tasking

Commanders must be able to understand and acknowledge if/when the
level of effort has expanded beyond their ability to effectively control
the operation.
Commanders and operators must understand what forces in the JOA are
capable of what missions. Assigned forces must also understand what
the Commander can do for them.
Command relationships should be generated based on mission
execution and sequencing rather than previous experience.
If the objective is to aggregate and fight from the sea, then a
sustainment plan should be planned from the sea as well.
Not all assets will be in place conducting missions that reflect the
changes in environment. It’s a requirement to remain flexibly minded,
as no plan survives contact.
Suboptimal command structure shortfalls can be alleviated by
subordinate command proximity (either by geography or informational
flow). The ability to develop plans with different staffs in the same
location cannot be overlooked.
CDRs must be able to convey their expectations to the subordinates.

B. Analysis of Player-Identified Data
After the game concluded, the DCAT performed structured analysis on the NGS’s six data
streams including descriptive quantitative statistics, qualitative content analysis and grounded
theory as discussed in Appendix F of this Report.
The terms provided in this section were identified using grounded theory and analyzed using the
ATLAS.ti co-occurrence function (see Appendix G). Pairs of terms scoring the highest overall
correlation values were included in this analysis. In addition, Pearson Product Moment
Correlation (i.e., “Pearson’s r”) and r-squared analysis were also performed on each of the term
pairs coded from the six data streams discussed in Section III of this Report. The overall
Pearson’s r was recorded at .937, suggesting a strong correlation between the paired terms
identified in this section. Lastly, r-squared analysis yielded a percentage of 87.8, meaning that
nearly 88 percent of the change in the dependent variables (implications on force structure, gaps
across DOTMLPF, evolution of command arrangements) could be explained by, or shared with
the change in the independent variable (naval force aggregation) .
Based on analysis of these data, fostering command relationships was deemed to be the most
critical gap presently faced in conducting cooperative Navy-Marine Corps operations. Analysis
further revealed that the doctrine, leadership, training, and organization facets of DOTMLPF
should be leveraged to improve these relationships and that such planning and coordination must
be considered prior to engaging in a conflict. The difficulties faced by the Navy and Marine
Corps in engaging in combined operations are depicted in figure 3.1.
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Most Important Components to
Mission Accomplishment
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Figure 3.1 –Analysis of NSG Player Responses: Most Important to Mission Accomplishment

Specifically, through pre-conflict training, exercises, games, and doctrine, both the Navy and the
Marine Corps need to develop a better understanding of one another’s unique culture, leadership
proclivities, and maritime and amphibious resources. Service staffs also need to become better
integrated in a simplified C2 structure. These gaps become most evident during combined
operations in the littorals, where commanders appear to face the greatest challenges due to a lack
of an integrated C2, and the absence of understanding in service culture and difficulties
holistically leveraging the Navy maritime capabilities and Marine Corps amphibious resources.
Not surprisingly, as game play moved from initial crisis response (vignettes 1 and 2) and the
advancement of the force into sustained operations (vignette 3), doctrine and organizational
needs stabilized, although requirements for continued training and leadership remained. As
depicted in figure 3.2, these factors were also deemed the most difficult to obtain in order to
accomplish the commander’s stated mission.
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Most Difficult Components to Mission
Accomplishment
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Figure 3.2 – Analysis of NSG Player Responses: Most Difficult to Mission Accomplishment

Specific analytic responses to three research questions posed in the Naval Services Game are
provided below.
Question #1: As a naval force aggregates afloat, what are the implications on force structure?
What are gaps and areas of concern across DOTMLPF?
Response: Overwhelmingly, players in both cells emphasized the importance of cultivating
command relationships as a precursor to effective force aggregation. These relationships were
defined as personal, structural, organizational, formal and informal, and were deemed a precursor
to effective force aggregation. Specifically, fostering organizational unity of command and
developing a simplified command and control (C2) element through the use of integrated staffs
were also identified as essential preparatory steps prior to engaging in a combined Navy-Marine
Corps fight. Further analysis into doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and
education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) revealed that the elements of doctrine,
organization, leadership and training manifest the greatest gaps in present-day Navy-Marine
Corps joint operations.
Doctrine
Throughout game play, several key doctrinal gaps affecting the ability to aggregate a naval force
were identified. The lack of guidance pertaining to command and control relationships among
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Navy and Marine Corps players was most notable. This included the lack of common
understanding of the service specific capabilities, terminology, tasks, organization and missions
which made coordination a challenge. Due to this lack of collective understanding, much of the
discussion during each vignette was spent trying to determine the initial command relationships,
as detailed in the following player comment:
A simple example comes in the form of how we (each of the services) talk about support
between different portions of the force. The ‘supported-supporting’ concept is very
normal to personnel in the US Navy, but is a little more foreign to personnel in the US
Marine Corps (that is not to say that we don't understand it, it is to say that it is not how
we do business on a day to day basis). On the other side of that coin, Marines tend to talk
about the Main Effort and supporting efforts. Neither is incorrect, and it was interesting
to note that during the course of the discussion we saw people saying effectively the same
things, but having trouble understanding each other because of the way they were
describing them.

Proposed solutions to these gaps focused on additions to or creation of new doctrine focused on
force aggregation. Many players described the need for a different way of thinking about,
organizing and employing control measures to eliminate the seam that exists between sea and
land domains during littoral operations. Current capabilities of services have changed
significantly, and that has fueled pre-conceived notions of how to conduct command and control
of aggregated naval forces, “for example, consider utilizing a JTF-capable Marine Corps staff as
a JFMCC that can affect the air, land and maritime domains” with Navy augmentation to
increase capability in the maritime domain. A preponderance of the players noted that
aggregation is highly achievable as long as there is common doctrine and understanding of
respective Navy and Marine Corps capabilities that is currently lacking.
Organization
Organizational shortfalls were highlighted during this game. Players noted that current
organizational stovepipes hamper flexibility and effective utilization of forces. This was
particularly evident when the players crossed service lines and integrated with Special
Operations Forces. In some cases, the TACON/OPCON relationships did not directly correlate
between the Navy and Marine Corps task organization. Participants were concerned about
getting the command and control relationships and organization right.
Players also cited the need to permanently integrate the Navy and Marine Corps staffs in order to
establish formal and informal relationships that would foster trust and mutual understanding.
“Creating a Naval Staff does not just happen by putting both Marines and Navy personnel on the
staff. The staff also needs to be functionally reorganized to ensure that all aspects… are covered
and that the staff is able to effectively inform the commander during the decision making
process.”
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Leadership
The need for strong support from both Navy and Marine Corps leadership for aggregating naval
forces was consistently noted throughout the game. Players stated that leadership was the key to
enabling all considerations in the development of a coherent plan and establishment of germane
command relationships. “The mission is well within the capabilities of the USN/USMC team, so
it falls on the leadership to navigate the C2 and ensure the forces are supported so they can get
on with the mission.”
Training
All players agreed that the Navy and Marine Corps lack the experience and knowledge base to
currently aggregate forces above the MEB/ESG level. Specifically cited was a lack of awareness
of each other’s service capabilities. Training for both service staffs is required to enhance the
interoperability of personnel and systems in support of naval aggregation. The infrequency of
MEB/ESG level exercises was also an area of concern. Players stated that a once a year exercise
such as Bold Alligator is not sufficient to develop the knowledge to perform this complex
operation. Frequent exercises will foster better understanding between the Navy-Marine Corps
staffs which in turn will facilitate intuitive decisions on command and control. “Conducting more
joint training events and stressing those seams is the only way to really reveal the problem so we
can come up with best practices and mitigating factors.”
Question #2: Relative to the following areas (Mission, Task Organization, Battlespace
Organization, and Command Relationships) as a naval force aggregates, how will command
arrangements evolve?
Response: Game participants identified lack of service culture awareness and diminished
understanding of cross-domain resources as the greatest challenges to combined Navy-Marine
Corps force aggregation. Specifically, Navy personnel did not fully comprehend amphibious
operations, whereas Marine Corps participants acknowledged only cursory familiarity with
maritime operations. This lack of fluency between the services presented the greatest challenge
for players when planning viable courses of action for combined operations in the littorals.
Moreover, because the composition and functionality of staffs are presently bifurcated towards
either maritime or land operations, mission planning, and task and battlespace organization
continue to challenge the commander engaged in combined Navy-Marine Corps operations.
Cell participants aptly noted that challenges abound based on whether or not “we are trying to
establish ‘joint’ command and control or ‘Navy and Marine Corps’ command and control that is
equally capable of affecting the sea, air and land domains” Respondents noted “we're pretty good
at joint C2 that takes place at the JTF-level, [however] what we need to develop is a
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reinvigorated ‘Navy and Marine Corps’ command and control capability.” This was deemed
especially important when establishing the “homogenous littoral battlespace.”
Lastly, players noted that evolving arrangements suggest that:
There are a few models that exist for what to do to bring MEUs together under a
MEB. We could simply leave them intact and allow the MEUs to operate. We
could disaggregate the MEUs and bring in additional GCE, LCE and ACE
headquarters. CSG and ARG/MEU intel organizations will continue to support
their primary tactical customers. Regardless, the challenge will be in allocating
scarce collection resources to support amphibious operations, air wing strike
operations, mine clearance, force protection of the ESF and forces on the ground,
and other combat operations in the littoral and on the ground.

Question #3: What are other potential approaches for aggregating naval forces outside of
typical organizational structures?
Due to the finite time constraints imposed upon game play (i.e., three vignettes over less than
two days of game play), participants in the 2012 Naval Services Game opted to focus on the
gaps, principles, and issues germane to force aggregation rather than delve into alternate
perspectives on atypical organizational structures. However, data garnered from both cells
suggests that regardless of organizational structure considered, greater emphasis needs to be
placed on cultivating command relationships, and simplifying and unifying command and
control structures.
It should be noted that the analytic findings of the NSG’s DCAT are consistent with the findings
of the 2009 Navy-Marine Corps Command Relationships Game and the 2011 Maritime Stability
Operations Game, both of which suggest a new paradigm of interoperability, one forged in preestablished relationships between entities such as the Naval services are important, especially
when the Navy and the Marine Corps are engaged in combined operations in the littorals. In the
words of the players, this issue “poses a series of important questions that we probably won't get
to in the conduct of this game, but certainly need to be looked in a future session.”

IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER
STUDY
The findings of the 2012 Naval Services Game suggest that as a conflict matures, Navy and
Marine Corps activities are able to become more integrated and function more effectively.
However, at the onset of conflict, coordination issues are a significant challenge for the
Operational Commander given the lack of pre-existing command relationships, disparate C2
structures, and cultural differences between maritime-focused Navy resources and amphibiousminded Marine assets.
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In order for effective mission accomplishment, a more holistic approach to developing command
relationships is warranted—one that emphasizes forming relationships pre-conflict through
improved doctrine, training, organization (including C2 staff integration), and leadership.
The 2012 Naval Services Game brought together warfighters from the USN and USMC in order
to explore issues germane to force aggregation in combined operations. Indeed, game findings
collectively highlighted the cultural differences between both services and the need to enhance
command relationships—ultimately yielding more integrated and efficient command and control
structures. Analysis further suggests that aggregating forces for operations conducted in the
littorals presents the greatest challenges for Navy-Marine Corps missions.
Additional efforts to cultivate command relationships should be undertaken including, but not
limited to conducting additional games focused on inter-cultural awareness and the continued
refinement of principles and gaps through analysis; developing and exercising C2 integrated
staffing models; and formulating doctrine to address aggregation and provide guidance to gap
closure. Moreover, the development of a 2013 Naval Services Game to continue exploring Navy
and Marine Corps operations is recommended. Lastly, the Naval Warfare Group should be
consulted to distill other tangible actions for future decision/direction.
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V. APPENDICES & SUPPLEMENTAL DATA
Appendix A – Scenario and Summary of Vignettes
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The NSG was a one-sided, professionally facilitated seminar event. It consisted of three,
unclassified, time-stepped vignettes, each of which expanded upon the aggregation of BLUE
forces in the maritime environment. The vignettes featured a notional scenario using real
world geography. The participants were placed into one of two BLUE cells who were
playing from the perspective of the Service Component Commander during vignette 1, and
from vantage point of the Joint Forces Commander during vignettes 2 and 3. The WHITE
cell (i.e., Control), was comprised of NWC WGD and MCWL WGD staff who served as the
Combatant Commander during vignette 1 and the Combatant Commander/Joint Task Force
Commander during vignettes 2 and 3.
Background
The fictional country of GREEN is a developing country in Southeast Asia with a population
estimated to be around 4,500,000 people. GREEN is an established democracy and a key
democratic partner of the U.S. in the region. The GREEN military is small, poorly trained, and
ill-equipped for a sustained military engagement. They have a ground force of approximately
five infantry brigades (BDEs), a motorized BDE, three militia BDEs and one special forces
battalion (BN). GREEN also has four squadrons of helicopters, as well as patrol boats. While
GREEN currently receives U.S. military training assistance, they are still poorly trained and
equipped across the board.
The fictional country of RED is also a developing country in Southeast Asia that borders
GREEN. The population of RED is estimated at around 6,500,000 people. RED is under the
control of an Authoritarian government. The military is far more advanced and numbered than
the neighboring country of GREEN. RED has a ground force comprised of two infantry divisions
(DIVs), two motorized DIVs, an airborne BDE, a riverine BDE, and two infantry BDEs. They
also have multiple squadrons and aircraft (fighter, ground attack, and transportation), an air
defense DIV, and a considerable maritime component. In addition, RED also has a cyberexploitation, attack, and defense unit though they have not demonstrated effective skills.
Scenario
The neighboring countries of GREEN and RED are disputing territorial boundaries and natural
resources. These disputes have led to confrontations between the two countries’ naval patrol
vessels over contested maritime borders. RED has blockaded the Mekong River which is an
important source of commerce for both countries. There are indications and warnings that RED
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intends to invade GREEN in order to settle border and resource disputes. RED actions are
threatening regional stability and economic growth. The U.S. President has ordered the U.S.
military, BLUE, to conduct Flexible Deterrent Operations (FDO) against RED and to be
prepared to defend GREEN if necessary.
Currently, U.S. Joint Special Operations Task Force - GREEN (JSOTF-G) and Special Purpose
Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTAF) with LPD-17 are conducting Foreign Internal
Defense (FID) and Security Force Assistance (SFA) operations in GREEN. Blue LCS is
conducting port calls and conducting Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) in the Gulf
of Thailand and a BLUE ARG/MEU is concluding an exercise in the vicinity of GREEN.

Figure A.1 Fictional Countries of Red and Green

Vignette 1: Initial Crisis
Vignette 1 starts at day C-7. RED has placed its forces on the highest level of security alert and
is currently conducting deception operations. They are massing their forces along the GREEN
border and preparing their mining vessels to get underway. RED is also increasing naval
patrolling in the vicinity of RED and the disputed islands and deploying their ASCMs. ISR
indicates that RED is preparing to invade GREEN.
The United States government, in response, has condemned the actions of RED, stating that
RED’S behavior not only infringes upon the sovereignty of GREEN, but also threatens freedom
of navigation, regional security, and regional economic growth. The President of the United
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States has ordered the military to prepare all necessary responses to deter RED, defend GREEN
if necessary, and to conduct Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) of 200 American
citizens (AMCITs). The AMCITs are situated in two locations: one hundred are in GREEN’S
capitol city of Phnom Penh and the other one hundred are in the west coast city of Sihanoukville.
Other than the in-country available forces, an ARG/MEU, CSG, and a second LCS are arriving.
At this time, BLUE actions in RED territory are limited to ISR. It is assessed that RED will most
likely not interfere with the NEO, but may challenge U.S. presence at sea. GREEN is currently
preparing defensive operations and has activated their militia.
PACOM Initiating Directive for Operation Deter and Respond
Mission Statement: On order, COMPACFLT conducts FDO and NEO in GREEN and adjacent
waters in order to deter RED aggression against GREEN and to safeguard American citizens.
USPACOM has designated COMPACFLT as the supported command for Operation Deter and
Respond. MARFORPAC and SOCPAC are designated as supporting commands.
PACOM Tasks to COMPACFLT:
 Conduct show of force
 Conduct ISR
 Conduct NEO
 Prepare to support U.S. forces in Green as required
 Provide Personnel Recovery
PACOM Tasks to MARFORPAC:
 Conduct show of force
 Conduct ISR
 Conduct NEO
 Prepare to support U.S. forces in Green as required
 Provide Personnel Recovery
PACOM Tasks to SOCPAC:
 Conduct ISR
 Conduct FID
 Provide support to NEO

Vignette 2: Advance Force and Entry Operations
Vignette 2 encompasses D-Day to D+15/C-Day C+15. The NEO has been successfully
completed. RED has invaded GREEN, but has not yet engaged BLUE forces. RED infantry and
airborne battalions (BNs) have occupied key terrain along the GREEN coast. RED’S naval
forces are operating along GREEN’S coastline mining GREEN waters. GREEN is defending
their territory, but their southern infantry has been defeated and their navy completely destroyed.
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GREEN has formally requested U.S. military assistance and BLUE has been ordered to defend
GREEN. PACOM has stood up the JTF Rapid Response. JFLCC is not yet arrived and is not
operational in the JOA at this time. BLUE available forces are: LPD-17, 2x LCS, SP MAGTF,
JSOTF-G, ARG/MEU, CSG, JFMCC, JFACC, MEB/ESG CE, MCM, a second ARG / MEU and
additional SOF.
JTF OPORD
JTF Mission Statement: On order, JTF Rapid Response conducts operations in the JOA to defeat
Red aggression against Green, in order to preserve the Green government and ensure Green
territorial integrity.
JTF Commander’s Intent
Purpose: Conduct operations to defeat Red attacking forces in Green, in order to preserve the
Green government and ensure Green territorial integrity.
Method: Rapidly aggregate joint forces to respond to the Red invasion of Green. Initially, we
will rely on forward postured naval and air forces to ensure our access to the JOA and to rapidly
shift to offensive operations against Red. We must rapidly build additional capabilities to
conduct sea and air control and take offensive actions to shape the landward battlespace. We will
swiftly project power in order to defeat Red forces in Green. As much as we are able, we will
maximize sea-based joint forces, so we are not reliant on or limited to a single S/APOD. We will
maximize our relationships with Green forces and the friendly local population. I envision
JFMCC being the main effort from phases I to IV.
Endstate: Green sovereign territory is secure, the Green government is preserved, and any Red
forces in Green have been defeated.
JTF CONOPS
Phase I – Shape and Control
JTF Tasks to JFMCC:
 Establish sea and air control
 Conduct offensive strike operations
 Conduct ISR
 Support Green forces and U.S. forces ashore as required
 Provide personnel recovery
 Conduct FID
 Provide terminal control for strikes
 Conducting Advance Force Operations
JTF Tasks to JFACC:
 Provide aerial refueling and ISR
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JTF Tasks to JFLCC:
 Prepare to receive and employ ground forces in following phases
Phase II – Offensive Operations
JTF Tasks to JFMCC:
 Maintain sea control
 Conduct offensive strike operations
 Conduct ISR
 Support Green forces and U.S. forces ashore as required
 Provide personnel recovery
 Conduct FID
 Provide terminal control for strikes
 JTF Tasks to JFACC
 Maintain air control
 Conduct offensive strike operations
 Conduct close air support for Blue and Green forces
 Conduct ISR and aerial refueling
JTF Tasks to JFLCC:
 Prepare to receive and employ ground forces in following phases

Vignette 3: Sustained Maritime Operations
Vignette 3 encompasses day D+15 to D+40/C+15 to C+40. RED forces are continuing to attack
on their way towards Phnom Penh. The BLUE JTF Rapid Response is continuing with
operations while the JFLCCis arriving in the JOA and preparing for operations. BLUE ground
forces have defeated RED’s airborne BN in the vicinity of Sihanoukville and have control of
GREEN’s Aerial Port of Debarkation (APOD) and Seaport of Debarkation (SPOD). BLUE has
defeated RED’s naval and air forces, establishing air and sea control. RED’s southernmost
motorized DIV and infantry BDE along the coast are stalled but continuing to attack, while
GREEN’s southern forces are on the retreat towards the capital. BLUE forces are in Phnom Penh
supporting GREEN’s defense.
GREEN and BLUE forces in the north continue to hold against the RED offensive. RED has
defeated one GREEN infantry BDE and a militia BDE. Though RED northern forces are stalled,
they are still continuing to attack. BLUE available forces include: LPD-17, 2xLCS, SP MAGTF,
JSOTF-G, 2xARG/MEU, CSG, JFMCC, JSOTF, JFACC, MEB/ESG CE, MCM, MPS/FIE, and
another CSG.
Vignette 3 ends with enabling the transition of ground operations to JFLCC control in order to
restore sovereignty and conduct stability operations.
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Phase II – Sustained Offensive Operations
JTF Tasks to JFMCC
 Maintain sea control
 Conduct operations to defeat RED offensive
 Conduct offensive strike operations
 Conduct SPOD operations and receive follow-on forces
 Conduct ISR
 Support GREEN forces and BLUE forces ashore as required
 Provide personnel recovery
 Conduct FID
 Provide terminal control for strikes
JTF Tasks to JFACC
 Maintain air control
 Conduct offensive strike operations
 Conduct close air support for BLUE and GREEN forces
 Conduct ISR
 Conduct APOD operations and receive follow-on forces
JTF Tasks to JFLCC
 Receive ground forces
 Prepare to conduct operations in support of GREEN in following Phases
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Appendix B – Final Outbriefs
BLUE Cell A:
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BLUE Cell B:
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Appendix C – Player Surveys
Player Background Survey
U.S. Naval War College
Player Profile Baseline Assessment Sheet
PLAYER NAME:_____________________________________________________________________
BRANCH OF SERVICE OR
ORGANIZATION:________________________________________________
PRESENT COMMAND:________________________________________________________________
TITLE (RANK IF MILITARY/RETIRED MILITARY OR GS IF
APPLICABLE):___________________________
DESIGNATOR OR MOS:________
TOTAL YEARS OF MILITARY OR DEFENSE DEPARTMENT SERVICE:_________
PLAYER AGE:_________

PLAYER SEX: M____

F____

HIGHEST EDUCATION LEVEL COMPLETED (CHECK ONE):
_____ High School

______Associate’s Degree

______Graduate Degree

_____Technical Certificate

______Bachelor’s Degree

______ Juris Doctorate

_____Doctoral Degree
(PhD, PsyD, EdD)

_______Medical Degree

____Other

____BLUE B

____WHITE

ASSIGNED CELL:
____BLUE A

WHAT SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTISE WERE YOU ASKED TO BRING TO THE GAME?
__________________________________________________________________________________
DESCRIBE ANY BILLETS HELD AT THE BATTALION LEVEL (USMC) / COMMAND LEVEL
(NAVY) OR HIGHER THAT CONTRIBUTE TO YOUR ABILITY TO SUPPORT THIS GAME:
__________________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________________
YEARS OF EXPERIENCE AT THE BATTALION/COMMAND LEVEL:______
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Post COA Player Survey
Naval Services Game 2012
INTRODUCTION: The purpose of this survey is to provide timely and candid feedback
regarding your experience in the formulation of your most recent Course of Action (COA). This
information will be forwarded to the Naval War College’s Data Collection and Analysis Team
(DCAT) for post-game analysis. Ultimately, your responses will greatly assist the Naval Services
in developing principles and identifying potential gaps that result from the aggregation of naval
forces beyond the ARG/MEU and CSG. You have 15 minutes to complete this survey.
Please indicate Player cell (Note for WebIQ: Should be a dropdown menu)
- Blue A
- Blue B
1. Based on the COA developed by my cell, the most important component or components to
accomplishing the mission is/are:
(Note: You may select up to three)
1) Doctrine
2) Organization
3) Training
4) Materiel
5) Leadership
6) Personnel
7) Facilities
2. Please provide additional clarification of your answer in the space below:
3. Based on the COA developed by my cell, the most difficult component or components to
accomplishing the mission is/are:
(Note: You may select up to three)
1) Doctrine
2) Organization
3) Training
4) Materiel
5) Leadership
6) Personnel
7) Facilities
4. Please provide additional clarification of your answer in the space below:
5. Based on the COA developed by my cell, the most important action required to achieve force
aggregation is:
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6. Based on the COA developed by my cell, the most difficult action required to achieve force
aggregation is:
7. As you reflect upon each of the questions asked in this survey including the important and
difficult aspects of force aggregation, what ideas, concepts, or principles are becoming more
apparent to you?
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Appendix D – Game Schedule
Tuesday, September 11, 2012
Start

End

Event

Remarks

Location

0715

0800

Check-In

Registration

MLH Lobby

0800

0825

Welcome

Welcome, Admin Remarks

DSC

0825

0845

Overview

Game Overview

DSC

0845

0945

Briefs

MOC and JFMCC briefs

DSC

0945

1030

Brief

MAGTF Brief

DSC

1030

1100

Brief

Composite Warfare Brief

DSC

1130

1200

V1

Road to War and Vignette 1

DSC

1200

1300

Lunch

NWC Café

1300

1330

Intro

Player Lunch
Cell introductions, Cell familiarization and
baseline survey

1330

1345

Situation

Situation Review

Room 207 & 211

1345

1445

COA

Cells Develop COAs

Room 207 & 211

1445

1500

Survey

Players’ Survey

Room 207 & 211

1500

1700

Dialog

Seminar Discussion

Room 207 & 211

1700

1730

Data

Tool-based Data Capture

Room 207 & 211

1800

1900

Social

No-Host Evening Social

Officers’ club

Room 207 & 211

Wednesday, September 12, 2012
Start

End

Event

Remarks

Location

0800

0830

V2

Vignette 2 In-Brief

Room 207 & 211

0830

0845

Situation

Situation Review

Room 207 & 211

0845

0945

COA

Cells Develop COA

Room 207 & 211

0945

1000

Survey

Players’ Survey

Room 207 & 211

1000

1200

Dialog

Seminar Discussion

Room 207 & 211

1200

1230

Data

Tool-based Data Capture

Room 207 & 211

1230

1330

Lunch

Player Lunch

NWC Café

1330

1400

V3

Vignette 3 In-Brief

Room 207 & 211

1400

1415

Situation

Situation Review

Room 207 & 211

1415

1515

COA

Cells Develop COA

Room 207 & 211

1515

1530

Survey

Players’ Survey

Room 207 & 211

1530

1730

Dialog

Seminar Discussion

Room 207 & 211

1730

1800

Data

Tool-based Data Capture

Room 207 & 211
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Thursday, September 13, 2012
Start

End

Event

0800

1100

Seminar

1100

1200

Prep

1200

1300

Lunch

1300

1400

Outbriefs

1400

1530

Dialog

1530

1600

ENDEX

Remarks

Location

Refine Principles and Gaps (Player Cells)

Room 207 & 211

Brief Preparations (Player Cells)

Room 207 & 211

Player Lunch

NWC Café

Cells Outbrief and Q&A

DSC

Facilitated Discussion

DSC

Final Discussions and Remarks

DSC
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Appendix E – Game Participants and Demographics
Participants
The demographic statistics included in this section of the Game Report are based on self-reported
responses from the players garnered during the baseline survey administered prior to the start of
vignette 1 (Appendix C). Thirty-five members of the USN and USMC, representing officer pay
grades O-4 through O-6 served as players in the Naval Services Game. All participants had
ample knowledge and experience to draw upon when developing potential courses of action and
identifying challenges that may limit the Navy and Marine Corps’ ability to aggregate a naval
force. The 35 players averaged more than 20 years of military experience. The players were
divided into two cells, providing a mixture of subject matter experts from the Navy and Marine
Corps in each.
Blue A Player Cell:
Brown, Daren
Dickey, Stuart
Donovan, Edward
Herrera, James
LaBranche, Rick
Lehane, John
Lowell, James
Ostrowski, John
Parker, Timothy
Parrott, Neil
Phillips, Ford
Posey, Carlos
Riccio, Marc
Seaman, William
Waltermire, Brad
Weathered, Ronald
Wissen, Frederick

LtCol
Col
LtCol
Col
CAPT
Maj
CDR
Col
Col
CAPT
Maj
LCDR
Col
CAPT
LCDR
LCDR
LCDR

Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Marine Forces Command
Combat Logistics Battalion 11, 11th MEU
I MEF
Carrier Air Wing 17
III MEF
Surface Warfare Officer’s School Command
3rd MEB, III MEF
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory
EWTGLANT
Ellis Group
DESRON 14
II MEF
Carrier Strike Group Two
Carrier Air Wing 17
COMCMRON THREE
CTF-24 TASW
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Blue B Player Cell:
Bjerke, Mark
Charney, Michael
Donegan, Don
Driscoll, Jerome
Gagnon, Jeffrey
James, Barry
Keefer, Jason
Landau, Fred
McMillan, Shannon
Negus, Thomas
Oles, Gary
Pluta, Jim
Schendler, Phil
Schreiner, David
Sile, Jack
Thom, Maxie

LCDR
LtCol
CDR
Col
LtCol
CDR
LtCol
CDR
LCDR
CAPT
GS-14
Maj
LtCol
Maj
Maj
Mr.

COMSUBLANT
1st Marine Regiment
MWDC DET Washington DC
Ellis Group
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
US Fleet Forces Command
MAG-16
USS GEORGE H.W. BUSH (CVN 77)
USS ARLEIGH BURKE (DDG 51)
Expeditionary Strike Group TWO
MARSOC
HQMC, Plans, Policies and Operations
Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Ellis Group
HQMC AVN
HQMC, Intelligence Department
OPNAV N2N6

In addition to the BLUE cell A and B participants, a final session including RADM John
Christenson (NWC), BGen Mark Wise (MCWL), RDML Ann Phillips (ESG-2), and CAPT
Michael Napolitano, representing RADM Michael Tillotson (NECC), was also conducted,
during which the perspectives and insights of these senior naval services leaders was captured for
inclusion in post-game analysis.
With respect to warfare specialties, 34 percent of participants served in the surface/submarine
warfare community, 29 percent were USN and USMC aviators, 14 percent were USMC ground
combat experts, 14 percent served in the intelligence/information dominance community, and 9
percent belonged to the USMC logistics military occupational specialty (0402).

Warfare Specialty Level
Surface/Submarine
Warfare
Logistics

14% 14%
9%

29%

Intelligence/Information
Dominance
Ground Combat

34%

Aviation
Figure E.1- Warfare Specialty
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Overall, players in the game reported to have had a moderate level of battalion or command
experience during their military careers.

Mean Years of BN/Command
Experience per Cell
10

Years

8
6
4

2
0
BLUE A

BLUE B

Group
Figure E.2- Comparison of BN/Command Experience between the Cells.

The NSG participants were highly educated, with 69 percent of the players holding a master’s
degree. Educational level of participants is displayed in figure E.3.

Education Level
Bachelor's
Degree
31%

Graduate
Degree
69%

Figure E.3- Summary of Game Participants’ Education from Baseline Survey
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Appendix F – Research Methodology
Overarching Methodology and Analytic Framing
Given the Naval Services Game’s focus on generating new knowledge to develop a better
understanding of force aggregation, the overarching methodology for this game was induction.
Specifically, the DCAT sought to identify terms, phrases, themes, and concepts germane to the
game’s three research questions. The preponderance of datasets encountered in the NSG were
qualitative, because they focused on the players’ opinions, beliefs, and values. Quantitative data
were also included in this project, especially demographic data pertaining to players’ ages, years
of experience, and level of educational attainment.
The collection of disparate datasets (i.e., both qualitative and quantitative) suggested that a
triangulative approach to analysis was warranted. This process allowed the DCAT to derive the
same or very similar conclusions using different datasets or methods. Triangulation has
incredible power as an analytic technique because it allows the researcher to distinguish between
exceptions and commonalities in data. Moreover, the use of a triangulative approach allowed the
DCAT to evaluate data with the appropriate methodology, rather than the methodology driving
the evaluation. A brief description of each analytic process use in this study’s inductive,
triangulative approach is described in this section of the Report.
Content Analysis: A method in which a researcher seeks objectively to describe the content of
communication messages that people have previously produced, content analysis involves
identifying coherent and important examples and patterns in the data and subdividing data into
coherent categories, patterns, and themes.
Grounded Theory: A more detailed and methodical approach to analysis than content analysis,
grounded theory employs systematic, hierarchical procedures to develop inductively derived
theory grounded in data. Grounded theory directs researchers to look for patterns in data so that
they can make general statements about the phenomena they examined. Selective, in-vivo, and
serendipitous coding were conducted on these data using the ATLAS.ti software application. The
use of ATLAS.ti is especially cogent for qualitative analysis, because the co-occurrence function
within this software function allowed the DCAT to determine the level of correlation between
terms from little or no correlation (r=0) to moderarely correlated (r=.50) to strongly correlated
(r=1.00). The co-occurrence function is similar to Pearson Product Moment Correlation in
quantitative statistics, because the closer the r-value comes to absolute value 1.00, the stronger or
more highly correlated the relationship between the two terms. Lastly, although direction of
relationship cannot be computed in ATLAS.ti due to the qualitative relationship of the data, rsquared analysis was subsequently performed in an effort to determine the percentage of shared
relationship between each pair of coded terms.
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Ethnography: Rooted in the field of Anthropology, ethnography occurs with a natural setting
and seeks understand the social interactions and rationale of players’ of decisions during the
course of game play. Ethnographers assigned to BLUE Cell A and BLUE Cell B captured
qualitative, descriptive data throughout the facilitated discussions, plenary sessions, and final
outbriefs.

Collection Approach
In order to answer the three research questions considered in the 2012 Naval Services Game, six
primary datasets were collected. These six datasets, their inherent value to this project as data
streams, and the approach used to analyze them are included in table F.1.
Dataset Name

Inherent Value of Data

Primary Analytical
Technique & Tool(s)

Cell-based COA

Collective Insights/Macro-level
Themes

Grounded Theory using selective
coding with ATLAS.ti

Participant Demographic Survey

Participant Background

Descriptive Quantitative
Statistics using Microsoft Excel

Post-Vignette Participant Survey
(Open Ended Questions)

Individual Insights

Grounded Theory using selective
and in-vivo coding using
ATLAS.ti

Post-Facilitated Discussion
Threaded Session (Plenary)

Macro-Level Insights

Final Outbrief Slides

Macro-Level insights

Ethnographic Notes from Plenary
Sessions and Final Outbrief

Macro-Level Insights

Content Analysis and Grounded
Theory using selective coding,
in-vivo and serendipitous coding
with ATLAS.ti
Content Analysis and Grounded
Theory using selective coding,
in-vivo and serendipitous coding
with ATLAS.ti
Content Analysis and Grounded
Theory using selective coding,
in-vivo and serendipitous coding
with ATLAS.ti

Table F.1 –Datasets Collected, Inherent Value of Data, and Analytic Techniques

Each of the datasets analyzed in this game are considered descriptive, because they emphasize
the nature of certain situations, settings, processes, relationships and systems. These descriptive
datasets were also aggregated to clarify the information that was gathered.
Before, during, and after the game, members of the DCAT ensured the following parameters for
these data streams strictly adhered to quality assurance/quality control requirements.
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Formatting and standardization: COA templates submitted to the White cell were required to
adhere to the structure provided by the control team. Any issues with the player cell’s inputs
were identified during the game and brought to the DCAT who immediately reported their
concerns to the Control cell for corrective action. It was the responsibility of the technographers
in each cell to ensure that templates were properly populated and saved in the correct location.
Internal validity: Collection instruments were designed to ensure that accurate conclusions could
be drawn from the data. To ensure their proper use during game play, specific internal validity
issues with these instruments and the information they were designed to collect were identified
during the Alpha and Beta tests, and were corrected prior to the start of player vignette number
one, which occurred during the morning session on 11 September 2012.
External validity: External validity applies predominately to the open-ended survey questions
that were asked in the individual cell player surveys that were captured via WEB-IQ on the
Unclassified Gaming Network (GAMENET). In order to provide quality controls on data
collection, such as freedom from researcher bias and clarity these questions were evaluated by an
internal focus group as part of the Alpha and Beta testing process, prior to being deployed in the
game.

Data Collection & Analysis Team Roles and Responsibilities
DCAT Co-Leads: Responsible for collection strategies, information technology challenges,
concerns with methodologies and analytic procedures, and tasked other members of the team
with preparation of report sections and ensured compliance with requisite deadlines. The DCAT
co-leads for the 2012 Naval Services were Dr. Hank Brightman and LT Lindsay Kaiser (USN).
Other DCAT members who supported post-game analysis and report writing included and Ms.
Janelle Gatchalian and CDR Parker Glasier (USN).
Data Collection Lead: Accountable for data management during the game as well as postexecution organization of files. Answered all questions regarding file structure, data
import/export, and information. The Collection Lead for this project was LCDR Stacey Auger
(USN).
Facilitators: Charged with management of the two player cells (BLUE cells A and B) to ensure
that player deliverables (e.g., COA sketches, individual participant surveys, WEB-IQ threaded
discussions, and cell outbriefs were completed on schedule. Fostered the environment for robust
and candid player discussion, and coordinated participant inputs to ensure that conversation was
germane to the game’s objectives and research questions. The facilitators for the NSG were Prof.
Doug Ducharme and Col Doug Stillwell (USMC-Ret.).
Technographers: Supported player development of the COA sketches for each of the three
vignettes, by assisting cell participants with creating their final outbriefs, displaying WEB-IQ
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generated outputs in order to support facilitated discussion in the plenary sessions, and ensuring
that data were properly saved in the appropriate formats and locations on the unclassified
GAMENET for subsequent analysis. The technographers for this project were LCDR Nick
Miller (USN), LCDR Chris Baker (USN), and Prof. Robin Babb.
Ethnographers: Employed a variety of data capture techniques to record player comments and
perspectives during game play and plenary sessions. Recorded observations in Microsoft Word
for use in post-game analysis. The ethnographers in the Naval Services Game were CDR Clint
Beck (USN), CDR Dave Flanagan (USN), CDR Parker Glasier (USN), LSCS Deanna Follis
(USN), and AG1 Rodolfo Ornelas (USN).
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Appendix G – Co-Occurrence Tables
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Appendix H – Player-Identified Proposed Definition of Naval Force
Aggregation
The Naval Services Game’s purpose was to explore the challenges associated with aggregating
naval forces in response to an emerging conflict. With this purpose in mind, players focused on
generating new knowledge in order to develop a better understanding of force aggregation. At
the beginning of gameplay, all participants were given definitions of key terms and concepts in
order to ground them in a common lexicon. Developed by the Ellis Group, Figure H.1 was the
definition of Naval Aggregation that players used to frame their discussions.

Figure H.1- Ellis Group Definition of Naval Force Aggregation

Towards the end of the game, the Ellis Group asked participants to refine the original definition.
While this was not in scope with the game design, BLUE Cell A players developed their
proposed definition, as seen in Figure H.2, and presented it during the final plenary session.
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Figure H.2- Player-Identified Proposed Definition of Naval Force Aggregation
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